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Introduction
Undoubtedly Carl Schmitt should be regarded as one on the most
significant political thinkers of the twentieth century - and certainly one of the
most controversial. As one of the leading legal scholars and most profound
conservative intellectuals of Weimar Germany Schmitt enjoyed in the 1920s a
reputation far beyond the borders of Gennany. A brilliant stylist and a truly
original thinker whose critique of the ideas and institutions of liberal
democracy came to fascinate generations of political thinkers of the right as
well as of the left, amongst others: Leo Strauss,' Hans J. Morgenthau- Walter
Beniamin,' Karl Mannheimer, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neuman, Herbert
Marcuse andJiirgen Habermas.t .
• Direct all correspondence to Jacob Als Thompsen, Department of History and Social
Theory, University of RoskiIde, Denmark.
1 On the relation between Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt see Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitttmd
Leo Strauss: thebidden dialogue (Chicago and London: The University ofChicago Press, 1995).
4
2 On Morgenthau's relation to Schmitt see "Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography:
1904-1932," in Kenneth Thompson, RobertJ. Myers (ed.), Truth and Trage4J: A Trilmte to Hans
]. Morgen/hau, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1984),pp. 15-16.
3 On Walter Benjamin's relation to Schmitt see Samuel Weber, "Taking Exception to
Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt," in diacritics 22, nos. 3-4, Fali-Winter, 1992, pp.
5-18.
4 On Carl Schmitt's influence on the Frankfurter School, see Ellen Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt
and the Frankfurter School," in Telos, Number 71, Spring 1987, pp. 37-66, and the comments
to this article by Martin Jay, Alfons Sellner and Ulrich K Preuss in the same issue. Telos made .
a following special issue on Schmitt (Telos, Number 72, Summer 1987).
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Sclunitt was born in 1888 in the small town of Plettenberg in the
Sauerland and raised as a catholic. He studied law in Berlin and Strassburg
graduating from The University of Strassburg in 1910. Under the influence of
the Getman defeat in the WW I (where Schmitt served in the state-of-war
section of the general staff in Munich), the dissolution of the Second Reich
and the following political chaos of the Weimar republic, Schmitt, as a
professor of law and a very active publicist, became one of the sharpest critics
of the modem, liberal parliamentary state, and in a broader sense of
individualistic liberalism. Concerned for the public order and the threat to it
from radical political forces (communists and Nazis) he, from a conservative
position during the 1920s and 1930s, pointed to what he took to be the
weakness of the liberal construction of the state embodied in the Weimar
constitution, and refuted legal normativism in favour of decisionism.
Schmitt's reputation as a political thinker is primarily based on a number
of brilliant works from the Weimar period, in which he addressed the
fundamental problems of political theory; the nature of sovereignty, the basis
of constitutionalism, the purpose and limits of political power and the
legitimacy of the state.> Schmitt tried to address these questions - which had
preoccupied Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant - to the
industrialised society of the twentieth-century, arriving at a harsh critique of
the liberal concept of politics, parliamentary democracy and the liberal
constitutional state. Among Schmitt's central ideas was the thesis that
democracy negates liberalism and liberalism negates democracy (Die
geistesgeschichtliche Loge des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 1923), his concept of the
political as essentially being the distinction between friends and ene-mies (Begriff
des Politischen (1927/32), and his definition of sovereignty as a question of 'who
decides on the exception' (Politische Theoloie, 19??). Following his political
thinking and fear of political chaos Sclunitt in the later years of the republic,
as a constitutional advisor to the Hindenburg government, provided the legal
and theoretical justification for the extensive use of emergency powers by the
Reich president under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.
5 The literature by and on Carl Schmitt is vast, for a bibliographical overview that includes
the later literature on Schmitt see e.g. Andreas Koenen, Der FaDCarlSchmitt. Sein hiJitieg if/m
"Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches" (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995),
Paul Noack: Carl Schmitt. Eine BiogJ-aphie (Berlin, Frankfurt a.M. : Propylaen Verlag, 1993),
Dirk van Laak, Gespmche in tier Sicherheit des Schweige1zs. Carl Schmitt in tier politischen
Geistesgeschichte tierfriihm Bundesrepublik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993). Monographies on
Schmitt in English see e.g. George Schwab, The ChaDenge of theException. An Introduction to the
Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936 (New York & Westport, Connecticut &
London: Greenwood Press, 1989), Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt. Theorist for the Reich
(princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and
Theory (New York & Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1990).
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CarlSChlJlitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
Although few doubt the significance of his work, Carl Schmitt remains
one of the most controversial figures in modem political philosophy. Often
described as a fascist, a nihilist and an opportunist, and as a (prophet of the
totalitarian state', to many people he came to symbolise the intellectual
undennining of parliamentary democracy in Weimar Germany and the
coming to power of the Nazis. The major reason for Schmitt's controversiality
is the fact that he after the Enabling Act of March 1933, took a conciliatory
attitude towards the Nazis and decided to become their self appointed
ideologist or (Crown Jurist'. Although Schmitt had supported the use of
emergency powers to keep the anti-republican political forces from power in
the final years of the republic, and in his 1932 publication Legalitat und
Legitimitiit had warned against the possible coming to power by legal means by
the communists or National Socialists, Schmitt joined the Nazi Party in May
1933 (the same month as Martin Heidegger). During the following three years
he published a series of articles defending the new Nazi-state. In July 1933 he
became a member of the Prussian Council of State and was appointed to
head the professional group of university professors in the National-Socialist
Jurist' Association the same year. Schmitt's situation became precarious during
1936 when he was attacked in the Gestapo organ DasSchw~ Korps, which
led him to withdraw from public life. .Anyway he was interned by the
Americans in September 1945 and imprisoned for more than a year, though
he was never formally charged.s
Because of Schmitt's association with the Nazi-regime in 1933-36 he was
banned from post-war academic life as the political theorist or 'Crown jurist
of the Third Reich' and for a long time his works was largely ignored outside
Gennany. As more recent studies have shown Schmitt remained, however, a
central source of inspiration for political thinkers, notably on the far left or the
far right.7 During the 1980s and especially after Schmitt's death in 1985,
6 The interrogation Reports of Carl Schmitt have been translated and commented byJoseph
Bendersky in Telos, Number 72, Summer 1987,pp. 91-129.
7 On Schmitt's influence after 1945 see e.g. Ellen Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt in West German
Perspective," in West El1ropean Politics, Vol. 7, No.3, 1984, pp. 120-27, Dirk van Laak,
Gespriiche in der Sicherheit des Schweigen.r. Carl Schmitt in tierpolitischen Geistesgeschichte tier friihen
Blmdesrepublik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), Dirk van Laak, Der Nachlass Carl Schmitts, in
Deutscbe ZeitschtiftfiirPhilosophie, Vol. 42, Number 1, 1994,pp. 141-154,Paul Gottfried, "The
Nouvelle Ecole of Carl Schmitt," in Telos, Number 72, Summer 1987, Wolfgang Schieder,
"Carl Schmitt und ltalien," in Vierteliahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, heft 1, januar 1989, pp. 1-21,
Reinhard Mehring, (evom Umgang mit Carl Schmitt. Zur neueren Literatur," in Geschicb/e 1I1uJ
Geschellschajt 19, 1993, pp. 388-407, Gunter Maschke, Carl Schmitt in Europa. Bemerkungen
zur italienischen, spanischen und franz6sischen Nekrologdiskussion, in DerStaat, Band 25,
Heft 4, 1986, pp. 575-599, Armin Mohler, Schmittistes de droite, Schmittistes de gauche, et
Schmittistes etablis, in Nouvelle ecole 44 (Spring 1987), pp. 29-66, Ulrich K. Preuss, "Political
Order and Democracy. Carl Schmitt and his influence," in Poif101l Studies in thePhilosop,?:; ofthe
Sciences andtheHumanities, Vol. 33, 1993,pp. 15-40.
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interest in Schmitt's work received a remarkable renaissance, especially among
post-Marxists and among the different groupings of the new right, notably in
Germany and France. In fact today Carl Schmitt, together with his old friend
Ernst Jiinger, have become almost mythological figures, and Schmitt is the
central philosophical reference point for the more intellectual parts of the new
radical conservatives in Continental Europe. A glance in periodicals like the
German JU1lge Fndheit or the French NotllJelie ecole leaves little doubt of this.
However, one might judge the political thinking of Carl Schmitt, he - as
Ulrich Preuss has noted - 'could not have gained the paradigmatic significance
if his work had lost all relevance after the eradication of the Nazi regime or if
it had slumped to a mere object of Geistesgeschichte. His rise to a "case"
appears only understandable if his work has still some significance for uS...'.8
However, a central question in the debate about Carl Sclunitt remains what
led him to collaborate with the Nazis in the first place? Was it a result of
ambition and intellectual pride, an act of personal opportunism or does the
answer lie in the axioms of his political philosophy? In my opinion it is not
possible to point to any single factor which can explain Schmitt's conciliatory
attitude towards the Nazis. As Schmitt's American biographer Joseph
Bendersky has put it 'the reasons for his collaboration lie in a labyrinth of
personal involvement, closely intertwined with his basic political philosophy"?
Thus, it is not the purpose of this paper to give a complete analysis of the
background for and the intentions contained in Schmitt's association with the
Nazis, but to point to one possible explanation in Schmitt interpretation and
use of one of hismajor sources of inspiration: Thomas Hobbes. In looking at
Sclunitt's interpretation of Hobbes Leviathan, my primary intention will be to
point to ways in which this a) can illuminate the neo-hobbesian aspects of
Schmitt's own theory of politics and his view on the state, and b) can explain
for Sclunitt's political manoeuvring during the 1930s and his view of the
Nazi-state.
Schmitt's interest in Hobbes
Carl Schmitfslong-term interest in Thomas Hobbes is well known and,
to anyone familiar with the writings of Carl Schmitt, it is easily inferred from
his writings. The clearest expression of this interest is the fact that Schmitt
subsequendy turned his lectures on Leviathan into a book in 1938, entitled
s Ulrich K.. Preuss, "Political Order and Democracy. Carl Schmitt and his Influence.." In
Po~ Studies in thePhilosophy oftheSciences andtheHumanities, Vol. 33, 1993, pp. 15-40, pp. 15.
9 Joseph Bendersky, "The Expendable Kronjurist: Carl Schmitt and National Socialism,
1933-36," in JournalofContempo17lTJ History, Vol. 14, 1979, pp. 309-28, pp. 310.
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CarlSchmitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
DerLeuatban in tier Staatslelm des Thomas Hobbes - SinnandFehlslag einespolitischen
Symbols.10
Even in the beginning of the 1930s, before his lectures on Leviathan,
Schmitt's admiration for Hobbes was known. This can be seen in his
correspondence with Leo Strauss.'! In his famous (and notorious)
(1927/1932) work DerBegriJ! des Politischen he had focused attention on what
he conceived as being Hobbes' central concern - his protection-obedience
axiom - which, in a modified version, Schmitt made his own,12and in 1937 he
had published a smaller article tided DerStaat als Mediamsmus bei Hobbes und
Decartes13• As Paul Gottfried has put it, Schmitt's 'association with Hobbes
became'in fact 'so firmly fixed in Schmitt's own mind that both his disciples
and his critics now take it for granted'J"
Sclunitt's book on Leviathan is interes ring in several respects. Seen in it's
historical context of 1938, after 5 years of Nazi-rule and after the attacks on
Schmitt's person in 1936, DerLeuatban can be read as a critical comment to
10 This first edition was published by Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt AG., Harnburg-Wandsbek,
1938, on the fiftieth birthday of Carl Schmitt and on the three hundred 'and fiftieth
anniversary of Hobbes' birth. A second printing appeared in 1982 in Koln: Hohenheim
Verlag. The latest available edition in German came out in 1995 on Klett-Cotta; Stuttgart,
with a commentary by Gunter Maschke. An English translation has been published recently
by Greenwood Press, translated by George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein, with an introduction
by George Schwab, entitled TheLniathan in theStateTheory of Thomas Hobbes: meaning andfaihlre
ofapolitical symbol 01Iest Port, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996).
11 In a letter to Schmitt dated 10 of July 1933, Leo Strauss asks for information on and a
recommendation from Schmitt to participate in a 'critical edition 0 f the works 0 f Hobbes'.
Published in Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: the hidden Dialogue (Chicago &
London: The University ofChicago Press, 1995).
12 "No foan of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and
obedience. The protege ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state. A political theory
which does not systematically become aware of this sentence remains an inadequate
fragment. Hobbes designated this (at the end of his English edition of 1651, P: 396) as the
true purpose of his Leviathan, to instill in man once again "the mutual relation between
Protection and Obedience;" human nature as well as divine right demands its inviolable
observation". In CarlSchmittThe Concept of thePolitical (Chicago & London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 52 Schmitt published an early version of his article in 1927 in
Archiv flir Soi}alwissenschajt lind SoiialpolitikJ Band 58, Heft 1 (1927), pp. 1-33. The English
translation is based on the expanded monographic edition that was published in 1932 by
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin.
13 This appeared in Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, vol 30, pp. 622-32 It appears
in an English translation as an appendix in The Leviathan in thestate theory of Thomas Hobbes. See
note 10.
14 Paul Edward Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory (New York & Westport,
Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 39.
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1S Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitote Salus.Eifahrun.gmderZeit1945-47(Koln: Greven Verlag, 1950).
Schmitt shared with Hobbes the anthropological assumption that human
nature was fundamentally dangerous and the state of nature, the primal
hum~ condition, was, therefore, characterised by chaos.18 According to
Schmitt, the fundamental human condition and the basisofhuman interaction
is therefore conditioned by conflict, and any 'genuine' theory of politics must
accordinglypresuppose 'man to be evil, i.e., byno means unproblematic but a
dangerous and dynamic being'.l9 Hence one of Schmitt's main criticisms of
liberal political theory was that it does not acknowledge this condition, but on
the contrary rest upon an idea of rational reasoning and the belief that
conflicts of interest can be solved through rational discussion. To Schmitt this
is a dangerous illusion that does not take into account the fact that sudden
human conflicts are of a fundamentally antagonistic nature and cannot be
solved through rational discussion.w To Schmitt the religious wars were an
example of this.
Carl5ch/nit! - 20th-Cent"ry Hobbesian?
..As the subtide of Schmitt's book indicates (Sinn und Fehlschlag eines
politIschen Symbols) Hobbes' first mistake was his choice of symbol. In the
Old Testament the Leviathanwas the giant sea dragon that no power on earth
could withstand. It rises from the sea and overwhelms Behemoth the land
~~ best sources for the study ofSchmitt'sview on Hobbes are his Begriff
des Po/itzschen from 1932 and his book on Leviathan, Der Leviathan in tier
Stoatslehre des Thomas Hobbes, from 1938. In theseworks Schmitt both admires
and criticises Hobbes. In DerLeviathan he on the one hand celebrates Hobbes
for being the first political thinker to have realised the decisionist substance of
state politics. And on the other hand he argues that Hobbes' theory erred in
some crucial ways which, contrary to his own intentions, made him the
precursor of the constitutional state based on positive law.
Schmitt's interpretation of Hobbes
18 As Leo St~auss pointed out in his Note.r on the The Concept of the Politi«J1, there is also a
fundamental difference between Schmitt's and Hobbes' definition of the state of nature: 'For
Hobbes, it is the state of war of individuals; for Schmitt, it is the state of war of groups
(especially of nations). F~~Hobbes,..n ~he state of nature everyone is the enemy ofeveryone
else; for Schrnttt, all political behaVIor IS oriented toward friend and enemy.' In "Notes on
Cad Schmitt, The Concept of the Political" in Carl Schmitt, The Concept ofthe Political
(Chicago & London: The University ofChicago Press, 1996), pp. 90.
19 Carl Schmitt, The Concept,?! the Political (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1996), pp. 61.
20 Marxism was to .Schrnitt a better foundation in that it identified a fundamental conflict of
class. Howeve.r, in re~tion to Schmitt's catholicism its ateism and singular focus on materialist
reasons for this conflict made it just as problematic.
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the Nazi-regime, and as a key to the question ofwhere Schmittpla~ed himse~f
between Nazi-communitarianism and Weimar individualism. In this res~ect it
becomes central in the interpretation of Sclunitt's role as 'the Cro~n JUG.st ~or
the Third Reich' and for the question of continuity versus discon~~ty
between the pre-1933 and the post-1933 Schmitt. Both favourable ~d critical
commentators of Schmitt have thus focused attention on Der Leviathan as a
key to the understanding of Schmitt's own politi~al theory and his conc~pt. of
the state. Not surprisingly it has been used both 111 order to show a totalitanan
and a more liberal nature of Schmitt's work.
As is clear from Schmitt's commentary on Leviathan, Schmitt saw a set
of striking parallels between his own times and conceptualisations and those
of Hobbes. The notes he wrote during his post-war confinement d~ell on
these parallels.P Like Hobbes in seve~~eell~ ce~~ry England; Schmitt s.a~
himself as being confronted with political instability and the threat of civil
war. And as Hobbes had done before him Schmitt saw the pro~lem as
originating in the absence of a strong single authority and they both pointed to
the state as the ordering principle.
As Hobbes had been before him Schmitt was preoccupied with the fear
of chaos and the concern with physical safety and public order. Pe~aps m~re
than any other political thinker since Hobbes Sc~tt ~~ be identified W.l~
this concern for public order at the expe~se of ~divtdual freedom .. Like
Hobbes Schmitt stressed the centrality of VIolence Ul the hwnan expenence
and he associated sovereignty with 'power being exercised on behalf of
groups locked in conflict'. As Paul ~ottfried has note~ both favo~ble
commentators of Schmitt, such as Julien Freund and Gunter Maschke and
liberal democratic critics, such as Helmut Rumpf, agree on these parallels."
Rumpf notes on this comparison: 'Hobbes is con~e1Vative to ~e ~xtent that
the stability of the civitas is more importan~ ~or him. than the significance of
individuals and social interests. He is a political realist to the extent ~at he
knows that the Behemoth of the Revolution threatens the Leviathan
constantly; this tenacity and vigilance are require~ ~or the maint~nance o~ s~te
authority....Insofar as C~ Schmitt held a. s:mar perspective, a similar
function was attached to his work or parts of it',
17 Helmut Rumpf, CarlSchmittund Thomas Hobbes. ldeelle ~eiieh1l1lgm IITlI1 aktueUe Bedeutzmg. Mit
einer Abhandlzmg iiber: Die Friihschriften CaarlSchmitts (Berlin: Du.~cker & Humblot, 1972),pp.
122. Here in translation from Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory (New York &
Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1990),pp. 39.
16 See Gunter Maschke's appendix to Carl Schmitt, Der Levia~han in tierStaatslebre de~ Thomas
Hobbes (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995) a~d Julien Freund, "Les lignes de force de la pensee de
Carl Schmitt," in Nouvelle Ecole, 44 (Spring 1987), pp. 12-14.
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destruction o~ the Hobbesian state was marked by the development of the
concepts of nght and law, and the general legalisation of the constitutional
state, that transformed the state into 'a positive system of legality'. Now the
state had been robbed of any substantive content of its own and
jurispm~ence .was ~o longer a personal judge pronouncing decisions, but a
mecharusm dispensing roles: 'The Legislator humanus became a rnachina
legislatoria'.23
CarlSchmitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
As Gottfried has observed Schmitt's interpretations of Hobbes had little
discernible impact beyond his own followers on the way other scholars read
Hob?es. In his time the best-known German study of Hobbes was the one by
Ferdinand Tonnies, He conceived Hobbes as a forerunner of the modem
liberal state, influe~ced by the new sciences of the seventeenth century.
Contr~ .to Schmitt, Tonnies related Hobbes' political thoughts to the
materialistic prenuses developed in Hobbes physics and anthropology and
saw Hob?es as a proponent of a sovereign regime based on popular consent
To Tonnies, Hobbes viewed civil society as an artificial construction made for
the ~r~tection ~~ individuals. This was brought into existence through the
(~pli~t or e~pli~lt) consent of allwho subjected themselves to a sovereign.>'
Tonrues mamtam~d. th~t both Hobbes' De Homine and De Corpore
presented an atorrusnc view of human nature, which is reflected in the view
on social ~uestions in Leviathan. This source of his political thinking made
Hobbes view on the state, as presented in Elements of La» (1640), De Cive
(164~, eng.ed) ~d Leuaihan (1651), points of entry to modem liberal
doctnnes, according to Tonnies.
Tonnies' interpretation became paradigmatic for the views of other
scholars on Hobbes. In his famous comments on Schmitt's Begriifdes Politischen
Leo Stra~ss referre~. to Tonnies in criticising Schmitt's appeal to a Hobbesian,
but non-liberal political tradition-" .As in the case of Tonnies, Strauss viewed
Hobbes as the 'founding father of liberalism', and he maintained that it was
impossible to provide a critique of liberalism on the basis of his work that
'moves beyond a liberal horizon'. In the works of both- Tonnies and Strauss
Hobbes reduced the function of govemment to the protection of 'naked life:
power. In the Jewish-Christian tr~tion this s~bol had always been a hateful
image, something, which according to Schmitt, Hobbes was not aware o~.
Unintentionally, the substance of the modem s~te, as represented by ~s
image, was therefore misunderstood in the centunes to follow, as something
abnormal and contrary to nature.
Hobbes' second major mistake was that he distinguished betw~en :'~th':
and "confession" and declared the state neutral with respect to its clttz:ens
religious beliefs C'confession"). In Schmitt's opinio~ this ~~ seno,us
consequences, in that the space Hobbes reserved f~r pnva~ religious ~elief
became the gateway for the subjectivity of bourgeois conscience and pnva~
opinion. A gateway through which these phen?me~a gradually unfolded their,
subversive forces. History had shown that this pnvate sp~ere had ~xtend~d
into the bourgeois public sphere and, via the authonty ~ legJ-slate 10
parliament, bourgeois society had fin~y overthrown the LeVla~an. In D~r
LsuaibanSchmitt shows this degeneratlon of the state by con~trucw:g an ann-
Semitic genealogy of the enemies of Leviath~.He started with Spmoza who
(as a Jew) approached religion from the outside .and opened up a .dange~us
breach for individual freedom of thought This genealogy continues With
Moses Mendelsohn, the Rosicrucians, the freemasons and illuminates o~ers
of the late eighteenth century, and ends with the 'emancipated' .Je~s; Heme,
Borne and Marx.21 The result of this process had been a neutralisatl?n ~f.~e
Hobbesian state, turning it from a myth into a machine. As the subJe~tlVl~es
proliferated and gained in power they demand~d that the state be objective.
The result of this would bethe complete neutrality of the state.
Schmitt maintained that to Hobbes there had been three Leviathans: the
mythical monster, the representative person and the machine:
In the forefront stands conspicuously the notorious mythical leviathan, that has
assimilated god,man, animal, and machine. Next to it .serves a juristicallyconstructed
covenant to explain the appearance of one sovereign person brought abo~t by .
representation. In addition, Hobbes transfers - and that seems to me to be~e gtst of
his philosophy ofstate _the Cartesian concep~n ofman as II ~echarusmWIth II soul
onto the "huge man", the state, made by him into a machine animated by the
sovereign-representative person.22
1\JL4RS/ SodalThought & Research
However 'in the eighteenth century the leviathan as ma.rz~ J;omo, ~ the
godlike sovereign person of the state, was destroyed. from within',~d ,to ~
increasing extent the state was perceived as a mechamsm and a machine. This
21 Carl Schmitt The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes. lvleaning and Failure of a
Political Symbol <Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996), chapter V and
VI.
22 Ibid., pp. 32.
23 Ibid, pp. 65.
24 Ferdinand Tonnies, Thomas Hobbes. LebenundLehre,rpt of 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt
1971), pp. 202-6. Here taken from Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory (New York &
Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 40.
25 ~e Strauss' comments "Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political" in Carl




-Hobbes Relevance to Schmitt
b~~ee~ the ~oral ,doctrines in Leviathan and modem technological
civilisanon. Tills reading of Hobbes is clearly marked by Schmitt's own
contempt for the unconcrete, impersonal and 'soulless' functionalism of
mode~ powe~ structures. Although Schmitt does not deny that Hobbes did
not reject ~e Idea of an efficient administration, he stresses that Hobbes set
out to deV1~~ for sovereigns 'those theorems that might enable them to make
prope.f decisions for their peoples'. He did not envision a mechanised world
Ul.which rerson~ decisions would give way to 'administrative acts that call to
mind t?e alternating red and green flashes of traffic signals'.29 In the centuries
followmg ~obbes the Hobbesian state had lost it relation to human authority,
however, this development had been against Hobbes will.
CarlSchlnitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian]
. The centrality of and intentions behind Sdunitt's 1938 work on
Leviathan have been viewed differently by his various commentators as has
the na~ of Schmitt's interpretation of Hobbes. Like most of Schmitts work
~er J.:'t'ttlthun possesses a form of argumentation which points in many
di~cnons, and leaves the reader in doubt as to what Sdunitt really meant. In
this.respect Helmut Rumph was correct when he noted that DerLeuatban can
b~ .Ulterpreted as a critique of the totalitarian system and as 'a totalitarian
cntique of Hobbes', which makes it difficult to conclude where Sdunitt
actually st~.~o Steven Holmes in a highly critical essay on Schmitt noted
that Schmitt himself after the war tried to impose the view that his book on
Hob.b~s was.'harmlessly liberal in spirit', thereby trying to hide a strongly anti-
Semitic ,senes of arguments and covering up his embarrassing Nazi-
sympathies.'! George Schwab, DerLeviathan's English translator and a highly
respected commentator of Schmitt (Schwab's book The Challenge of the
~Xceptio~l is considered one of the standard works on Schmitt's political ideas
m ~glish): argues on the other hand that Schmitt's book on Hobbes shows
~at ~lunitt was undoubtedly closer to an authoritarian fonn of bourgeois
liberalism than to Hiderian Nazism.'32
Instead Schmitt tries to find a traditionalist worldview behind Hobbes'
scientific political theory, and denies any kind of necessary correspondence
In his work in exile from 1936, The Political PhiLosopf!y ofThomas Hobbes: Its
Basis and Genesis, Strauss attacked Hobbes for disavowing the classical political
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Unlike these Hobbes had no interest in the
Good and the Just. Combining Epicurean sensualism and the materialist
philosophy of Lucretius, Hobbes ended up with an ego-centred ethic merged
with a materialist science. The atomistic view of society of political liberalism
and its focus on individual material interest was a by-product of this
Hobbesian Synthesis.-?
Schmitt did not deny that Hobbes was inspired by the intellectual
discoveries of his time, and drew on the new sciences of physics, anatomy and
advanced mathematics. But Schmitt was defending Hobbes agdinst those who
would interpret him 'superficially' - as stricdy a 'rationalist, mechanist,
sensualist, individualist'28. In Schmitt's opinion, Hobbes remained a reluctant
innovator. The degree to which Hobbes served political modernism was
despite himself and against his intentions. Thus, Schmitt denied that any kind
of constitutionalism or idea of individual freedom was intended by Hobbes.
Hobbes, to a much higher degree than Bacon, for example, is the.author of the i~eal of
civilization. By this very fact he is the founder of liberalism. The right to the seeunng of
life pure and simple - and this right sums up Hobbes's natural right - has fully the
character of an inalienable human right, that is, of an individual's claim that takes
precedenceover the state and determines its purpose and its limits;Hobbes's foundation
for the natural-rightclaim to the securing of life pure ,and simple sets the path to the
whole system of human rights in the sense of liberalism, if his foundation does not
actually make such a course necessary."
and thereby individualised the entire system of natural rights. In his comments
to Begriff des Politischen, Strauss writes:
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26 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
27 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy ofThomasHobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1952), pp. 1-5, 30-43. Here from Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory
(New York & Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 41. As has
been pointed out by several commentators, Strauss' hostile attacks on Hobbes can be seen as
a critical confrontation with Schmitt. Strauss completed his book after Sclunitt had joined
the nazi party in May 1933. In Strauss' communication with Schmitt before this happened, a
much more favourable picture of Hobbes is drawn. In fact an earlier draft of Strauss work
was presented to Schmitt, who liked it and wrote a convincing recommendation for a
Rockefeller Foundation Grant. It is, thus, very likely that Strauss' later attempt to underline
the modernist, naturalist and antisocial aspects of Hobbes' work was written to criticise his
former mentor.
28 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the Stote Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Faihm of a
Political Symbol. (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 11.
29 Here from Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory (New York & Westport & L d '
Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 48. - on on.
3~ Helmut Rum~h, Ca~ Schmitt u:rJ ThomasHobbes. ldeeUe BeiJehungen undaktueUe Bedeutung mit
emerAbhandlunguber: DIeFriihsr.hriften CarlSchmitts (Berlin: Duncker & Hu bl t 1972'\ 68m 0, 'hPp..
3E1 glStevden Holmes, !he ~1lOtO"!Y ofAntiliberalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London
nan: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 50. . ,
32 From SC?wab's in,troduction to Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory ofThomas
H
p
obbes. Meamngand,Failure ofa Political Symbol (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood
ress, 1996), pp. XXI.
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. rth hil d elling a little on Schwab's interpretation U1 that It
It 1S wo w e w . Sch b'
c1 ad th Schwab's biography of Schmitt presents wa s
even almth°re. e
th Yt C -~:tt's association with the Nazi-regime was built oncentr eS1S a UUlll11 th d . m of
'rnisiud ment' and 'failure to apprehend or acknowledge e ynanus .
.J ~ d th t c ...hrnitt already in 1938 had returned to a pre-1933 wanung
naz1sm an a UUU111 alll • h . thi
. tali·· According to Schwab Der Leuat. an 10 sway
agamst to tanarusm. .n .tt' liti al
becomes a central source for u:nderstan~g. both ~ s p~ c
manoeuvring in relation to the new Nazi-regune in the 1930s and a key to
understand'Schmitt's concept of the state.
Schwab's Interpretation of Schmitt: The creed for the qualitative total
state
T Sch b Schmitt's work. on Hobbes must be seen in it's historical
o f 19
w3a8'M
t Schmitt scholars share the view that 1936 constituted a
context 0 . os cks hirn i th 5S
'watershed' for Schmitt.33 As a consequence of the ~tta ~ on 10 e.
D S s: Y orbsin December 1936 34 Schmitt Withdrew from publicorgan as CfJW~ ~'VJ'y' '··t hi . .
life and primarily confinedhis activities to those assoaa~d WI s university
career. As has been shown by Bendersky and Schwa~ It seems reasonable to
believe that Schmitt was not lying when he later claimed that these attacks
caused him to fear for his personal safety.
With reference to this Schwab writes in his introduc.tion to the English
1 · f D Leviathmr. 'it appears to have been no acadent that he turnedtrans anon 0 er· dl . d .. h
to Hobbes again, for it was Hobbes, as Schmitt repeate y pointe o~.., w 0
based his theory of the state on "the mutual relation between Protecnon and
Obedience".'35 In this context Schmitt's book on Hobbes can be seen as a
critical comment to the emerging Nazi-state. Accordingly Schwab argues:
JJ On the political background for this, see: George Schwab, The Challenge 4 the~tqJr:n~~
Introduction to the PolitiCllI Ideas oj.Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936, (New ~or~h . tfin 0;.
G d Pre 1989' pp. 141-43 and Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl SchmItt, eons or ereenw~o sS', It . .' 5-43
Reich (pnnceton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 23 .
. . ich " 0 b 10 P 2 1936 In this article
34 See in particular "Es wird unrner noch peinlic er, ecem er , ., . ial
. . hi . iti hich both lacked a rac aspectSchmitt was accused of opportunism In IS ano-seml srn, W.l. 1 k
. 933' . d fri ndship With Jews A ater attac on
and had no connection to his pre-l wntmgs an ne .. fJ 8
d Db' f ft age confidentlal report 0 anuary ,Schmitt was launched by Alfre rcosen erg In a 1 een-p h d th 0·tl
, ddt d b Gunter Masc ke un er e e
1937. This report has been repnnte an. co~en e y d Jah 1937" in Zweite
"Das 'Amt Rosenberg' gegen Carl Schmitt: Ein Dokument aus em r
E/appe, Bonn, October 1988, pp. 96-111.
35 From Schwab's introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan ~n the State Theory of Thomas
Hobbes. Meaning and Faimre ofa Po/itiCll/ Symbol(Westport, Connecocut & London: Greenwood
Press, 1996), pp. x.
1h
CarI5ch/m·tt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
..that Schmitt used his writings on Hobbes to provide an assessment of and response to
emerging political realities. Stated succinctly, because of the Nazi hierarchy's failure to
heed his advice on the necessity of forging the new Germany into a qualitative total
polity, Schmitt insinuated the demise of the Third Reich. Moreover, as the new polity
was degenerating into a quantitative total one-party SS state, one that made a mockery of
Hobbes' relation between protection and obedience, Schmitt, disillusioned and
frightened, signalled in his writing on the Leviathan that he was reconnecting himself to
the pre-1933 Schmitt. 36
The pre-1933 Sclunitt that Schwab refers to is primarily Schmitt's Starker
Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft 37which appeared in print in January 1933 only
days before H:indenburg appointed Hitler chancellor, and which Schwab
views as 'the bridge to his past'. In this article Schmitt defines the difference
between a qualitative and a quantitative total state by their ability to
distinguish the political sphere (the state) from the non-political domain
(society). The qualitative total state in Schmitt's construct is above society and
thus in a position to distinguish friend from enemy, whereas the quantitative
total state is forced by society to "immerse itself indiscriminately into every
realm, into every sphere of human existence. (It) altogether knows absolutely
no domain that is free of state interference because it no longer is able to
distinguish anything"}8
As Schmitt had explained already in DerBegriffdes Po/itischen the erosion of
the boundary between state and society predates the twentieth century, but
the form it assumed in Weimar Germanycame from the outright competition
among a multitude of ideologically antagonistic 'total parties', which
succeeded with the use of the parliament in splintering the polity - that is, the
government of the state made 'the state the object of their compromises'. In
1932 Sclunitt had argued that, in spite of this development, it was not too late
to save the republic, since two pillars of the state, the bureaucracy and the
Reichwehr, were still in place, as was the President, who had far-reaching
constitutional powers under Article 48. Schmitt's solution to the problems, as
presented in Legalitiit lind Le,dtimitiit (1932)39 and Starker Staat undgesllnde
W'/rtschoft, was a depolitisation of society, which should prevent the societal
sphere from becoming a political battleground, Following this line of
36 Ibid., pp. x.
37 Carl Schmitt, Starker Sloat zmd geszmde Wirtschafl, in Volk rmd Reich. Po/itische M011Otshejte,
February 1933, pp. 81-94.
38 Carl Schmitt, Stareer Sloat und gesltnde lf7imchaft, in Volk rmd Reich. Politische Monatshefte,
February 1933, pp. 84. Here quoted from Schwab's introduction to, Carl Schmitt, The
Leviathan in theSfoteTheoryofThomas Hobbes. Metming andFailure ofa Politica! Symbol(Westport,
Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. x.
39 Carl Schmitt, Lega/itiit undLegitimitiit (Munchen & Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).
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To Schwab Schmitt's first major essay in the Third Reich Staat, Belt'egung,
r/rJik. DieDrngliedenlllg derpolitischen Einheit,44 published in 1933, shows that he
was still consistent with his pre-1933 writing in that it is posits 'state before
movement', thereby arguing against the Nazi-movement's take-over of the
state. However, as Schwab admits, Schmitt 'muddled the question of who
posses the monopoly of the political...when he declared that the political
emanated from the movement rather that from the state', and 'in asserting that
the leaders of the state are also the leaders of the movement'.f Already in
May 193~ Schmitt, however, returned to an insistence on the supremacy of
the state 10 Staatsgtfiige undZusammenbmch des :lJt'eiten Reiches: DerSieg des BUrgers
iiber den Soldate11,46 by pointing out the Reichswehr's status as the pillar of the
state; and by not mentioning Hitler's political brown shirt anny. Shortly after
this publication Schmitt published another work, Ober die drei .Arten des
RechswissenJchiftlichen Denkf!11s,47 in which he argued for a legal order based on
institutions to which individuals would belong depending on their
professional, business or political careers. Although Schmitt added that this
type of legal order could not be understood outside the context of national
socialism, Schwab argues that Schmitt 'by postulating a grassroots form of
politica11egitimacy....implicitly expressed his reservation about one-man rule
and his apparent belief that a legal order based on institutional justice had a
greater chance of surviving upheavals than other political systems do.'48
Carl Schmitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
Thus, it is Schwab's opinion that Der Lsuadian was a return to a
!10bbesian view of. the state~ which he more or less indirectly had presented
U1 the above mentioned articles from the first two years of Nazi-rule and
which had dominated his Weimar writings.
When Schmitt, to his own great surprise,42 was invited to participate in
the Nazi-administration in April 193343 and was later was asked by Goring to
join the Prussian State CoWlcil, he - mistak~nly in ~wab's view - tho~ght it
possible to help forge the Third Reich into this ~de~ of..a mearungful
qualitativestate. It was thus with a vision,not o~ a totalitanan FUhrer state, but
of a strong, neutral and authoritarian state ac~g for the ~ater ~ that
Schmitt entered the Third Reich. When he realised that this was a mistake,
and that the Nazi-regime was rapidly developing into a totalitarian one-party
quantitative state, not fulfilling the protection-o.~dience axiom of ~~bbes,he
by maintaining his pre-1933 view on state le~tunacy, became a cnnc of the
Nazi-rule.
argumentation he proposed banning political~arties that h~~ anti-n:p~bli~an
political programmes and proposed abando~g the ~tlOnal dis~ctlOn
between the state and society in favour of a tnple construction. According to
this the state would be designated as the political part, the public sphe~e. as
neither stricdy political nor stricdy private, and society ~ the .non-poli~cal
part.40 'Thisidea centred on the creation of an upper house in which ~rgarused
interests such as industry and agriculture, as well as the profeSSions and
vocational groups, would be represented. As envisione~ by Sc~tt in 1932
this body would not supersede the lower house of the liberal parliament, but
would complement it According to Schmitt in this con~truct 'a stroog state
would be in a position to endow the second house with th~ presnge an~
authority necessary for the men...to be freed from the allegiance to ~eu:
interests and would dare...to subject themselves to a consensual decision
without the fear of being chased out by their discontented bosses'."
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After the attacks on Schmitt's person in 1936 he realised that his past was
too comp~~sing, and that his hopes for the new state had been terribly
wrong. Realising the nature of the Nazi-state and its danger to his own person
40 Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und gesunde Wirlschojt, pp. 89-90. Here from Sc~wab's
introduction to. Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory ofThomas Hobbes Meamng and
Failure ofa Political Symbol (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp.
xu.
41 Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und gesrmde If''irtschaft pp. 92 Here form Sch~ab's intr~duction
to Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory ofThomas Hobbes. Meamng and..~atlure ofa
Political Symbol (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. X111.
42 As both Schwab and Bendersky have pointed out, Schmi~was a 'mark~d' man when he
entered the Third Reich. He was a known Catholic, a close friend to Marxists and Jews ~e
had dedicated his Verfassungslehre (1928) to his Jewish friend. Fritz Eisler), he was twice
married to Slavs and he had never joined the racist arguments against Jews or others.
44 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bnvegzm& Volk. Die Dreigliedming tierpolitischen Einheit (Hamburg:
Hanseatissche Verlagsanstalt AG, 1933).
45 S~hwab's introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Lniathan in the State Theory ofThomas Hobbes.
Meamng and Failure ofa Political Symbol (Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press,
1996), pp. xv.
46 Carl Schmitt, Stoatsgeftige und Zusammenbmch des zweiten Reiches: Der Sieg des Biitgers iiber den
Soldaten, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934).
47 Carl Schmitt, Ober die drei .Arten des Rechswissmschafllichen Denkms (Hamburg: Hanseatische
Verlagsanstalt, 1934.
43 In April 1933 Schmitt was invited to join a commission working on a law empowering
Hitler to appoint commissioners to oversee state governments.
48 Schwab's introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory ofThomas Hobbes




Secondly, Schmitt did not only legitimate his strong state by reference to
Hobbes' protection-obedience axioms. Schmitt's vision of a the new strong
state was also built on an organic vision that had much more communitarian,
volkisch, and excluding elements attached to it To Sclunitt a major problem
with the modem liberal constitutional state was its inability to protect itself in
situations of exception, as in Weimar Germany, Tills problem came from its
glorification of discussion and compromise (institutionalised in the
parliament) at the expense of decision. Schmitt not only refuted this form of
government with reference to its inability to govern, but also by arguing that it
had nothing to do with democracy. To Schmitt - whose concept of
democracy was essentially Rousseauian - democracy is characterised by the
identity between ruler and ruled, not by liberty, pluralism and discussion. To
Schmitt the task was, therefore, to create a new decisionist state that derived
it's legitimacy from its function as an organic expression of the national
community, something not very far from the Nazi-states volkisch image of
itself In Schmitt' view this organic nature was to be created through a
excluding cultural relativism that rejected universal moral principles of "right"
and "wrong" as guidelines for politics, and was build on a) a homogenised
people, and b) the identification of an (external) enemy. Only if these
premises were obtained was the qualitative total state able to exist This had
been the argument in Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentorismus
(1923):
In this respect Schmitt opted for a greater kind of obedience than
Hobbes, and therefore comes closer to a totalitarian critique of Hobbes than
to a 'constitutional reading' as indicated by Schwab. It seems to me that
Schmitt had not completely left this view on the state by 1938.
CarlSchmitt - 20th-Century Hobbesian?
The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous
power: the possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing
of the lives of men. The jus belli contains such a disposition. It'
implies a double possibility: the right to demand from its own
members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enernies.P
Firstly, Schwab's statement that Schmitt came close to underlining a
priority of protection over obedience, seems suspect in light of the fact that
Schmitt in Begrijfdes Politisdie» had stated that the state had the right to demand
the lives of its citizens:
Comments on Schwab
he returned to Hobbes' axioms of obedience and protection and noted that 'if
blizati be '49protection ceases the state too ceases and every 0 gatlO~ t~ 0 Y ce~es.
Schwab suggests that Schmitt even came ~ose to a constitutional reading o~
Hobbes in his statement that 'The specific lawstate elements of Hobbes
theory of state and jurisprudence were almos~ alwa~s ~sjudged'.50 ~d h~
underlined a priority of protection over obedience in his statement ~at it
would be a peculiar philosophy of state, if its entire chain of thought consisted
only of propelling the poor hwnan beings from th~ ~tter fear of the state of
nature only into the similarly total fear of a dominion by. :Nl010ch .or by a
Golem'A' With reference to this Schwab argues that Sclunitt's expenence of
the one-party 55 state led him finally to understand and appreciate Hobbes
individualism. 'This leads Schwab to the conclusion that
49 Ibid., pp. xviii.
Schwab's interpretation of Schmitt's reading of Hobbes in many respects
makes sense. Schwab's insistence that Schmitt's book on Leviathan to a very
large degree should be understood as a response to the historical
circumstances in which it came about is obviously important In this way it
seems correct to read DerLeuathan as a critical remark on the Nazi-state, and
as a product of Schmitt's own growing fears of and disappointment in its 'true'
nature. However, Schwab's analysis seems problematic in its attempt to
identify the Hobbesian elements of Schmitt's own concept of a qualitative
total state, and in its suggestion that Schmitt was coming close to a
constitutional reading of Hobbes. In this way it seems to' me that Schwab in
his reading of Schmitt ends up by underestimating a series of much more
communitarian and organic elements in Schmitt's vision of a new state -
elements that are less Hobbesian in nature. I shall indicate three problems
here:
Carl Schmitt was undoubtedly closer to an authoritarian form of bourgeois liberalism
than to Hitlerian Nazism. The Schmitt whose writings were published in 1938is more
Weimar individualistthan Nazicommunitarian, more praising ofHobbes as a father ofa
strong liberal state than as one who foanulated a justification for the e~e~nce of the
Hitlerian one-party state. It is true that Schmitt's concept of the qualitative total state
obligated citizens to obey the legally constituted authority, but their. obedience ~as
predicated on their being provided with security of state....What remains of Sdunitt's
state theory is not totalitarian in nature but authoritarian in foan and content, a theory
that he developed before Hitler's quest ofpower.52
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50 Ibid., pp. xix. The belief in parliamentarism, in government by discussion, belongs to the intellectual
world of liberalism.It does not belong to democracy...Every actual democracy rests on
51 Ibid, pp. xix.
52 Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
53 Carl Schmitt, The Concept ofthe Political (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1996), pp. 46.
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when it is decided upon, there will be no further discussion. In other words in
politics it is more important that decisions are made, than how they are made.
In Schmitt's decisionism the political decisions are neither bound from below
by the opinion of the citizens or from above by the norms of the laws.
From this line of argument's it is not surprising that Schmitt had no
problems in supporting the use of presidential power WIder Article 48 in the
Weimar constitution, but neither is it clear why he should have been
fundamentally sceptical towards the constitutional institutionalisation of the
strong man, expressed the Enabling Act of 1933. On the one hand Schmitt's
1932 publication Lega/itat und Legitimitat that defended the use of the
emer~ncy law.s under article 48, and Schmitt's proposal to ban the anti-
republican parties s?ortly.before Hitler's take over, can be seen as an attempt
to save the republic, which would indicate that Schmitt wanted a kind of
presidential dictatorship, but not a Fuhrer state. Most of Schmitt's Weimar
writings points to this conclusion, as Schwab and others have rightfully stated.
On the other hand, Schmitt's notorious article Der FUhrer schiitzt das Recht
(1934), which was published after the night of the long knives in which
Rohm's SA was erased and Schmitt's personal friend Kurt von Schleicher
killed, indicates that Schmitt was willing to sacrifice the republic in favour of
~e strong man. ~ this article Schmitt was defending the use of (illegal)
violence by asserting that the FUhrer had the right, in moments of extreme
danger to the n~tion, to act. as the supreme judge; distinguishing friend from
enemy, ~d ~g appropnate measures.v Although this article may have
?een wotten U1 an attempt to please the new rulers, that is from opportunism,
rt c~ot only be explained in this way. As G.L. Ulmen has pointed out
Schmitt's ~upport?f ~ strong presidential ruler and his later temporal support
of the FUhrer pnn~p (for what ever reasons), reveals a general distrust
towards the anonyrruty of the power structures of the modem state. This
distrust can also be found in the thoughts of Max Weber.57 To both Schmitt
and Weber power remained personalised and concrete but in contrast to
Weber, it seems that Schmitt thought it possible to recreate in the modem era
a personalised power that rested upon the charisma of a national leader. It
seems to me that this .belie~ could have been a crucial factor in his support of
b~th the ~s~ of presld~tI~ decrees and for Schmitt's later support of the
FUhrer pnnclp at the beguuung of the Nazi reign.
56 Carl Schmitt, Der Fuhrer sC~iiti! das Recht, in Positionen lind Begri.ffe (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1994) pp. 227-232. This article was originally published in Deutsche Jllristen-Zeihmg, 1
August 1934, Band 39, Heft 15, pp. 945-950. .
the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will no~ be treated e~ually.
Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second - 1£ the need anses -
elimination or eradication 0 f heterogeneity.54
Thus, to Schmitt the foundation of a decisionist state does not only lie in
the concentration of power in the state, but rests also on a cultural and
politically exclusive practice of defining who belongs to the friends and who
to the enemies (here also lies the philosophical background for Schmitt's anti-
Semitism, which is based on culture and not on race). One could say that
Schmitt here moves beyond Hobbes in that he reserves less space for cultural
diversity (e.g. Schmitt's critique of Hobbes' distinction between "faith" and
"confession") By not paying attention to this aspect of Schmitt's concept of
the state, one could accuse Schwab of making Schmitt less communitarian
and more individualistic than he actually was.
Finally, I will be slightly sceptical of Schwab's attempt to prove that
Schmitt 'expressed reservations about one-man rule'..and held the 'belief that a
legal order based on institutional justice had a greater chance of surviving
upheavals than any other systems do'.55 As Schwab .~orrecdy points out. it is
possible to get this impression in reading Uber die drei Arlen des
Rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens. In this respect one can agree with Schwab in
that Ober die drei Arten was an indirect criticism or warning against the dangers
of the FUhrer cult However one must also pay attention to Schmitt's Weimar
critique of constitutionalism to understand where Schmitt really stood in the
question of the FUhrer Princip. It seems to me that Schmitt's 1934 warning in
Ober die drei .Arten was more a warning against the concrete FUhrer than
against the idea of a strong man as such, and that the answer to Schmitt's
attitude on this point lies in his critique of constitutionalism, as it was
expressed in his famous rejection of Hans Kelsen's legal-normativism during
the 1920s.
In Politische Theologie from 1922 Schmitt had criticised the bourgeoisie
society's unwarranted belief in the legal arrangements of the state and Hans
Kelsen's idea that an all-embracing legislation would guarantee the stability of
the state. Schmitt's point was that laws cannot anticipate all eventualities, the
unpredictable situation - the exception - could by definition never be
predicted. nus means that the sovereign authority (the state) cannot always
be restricted by legal norms. Only an active state - not processual standards -
can, through its leaders, act efficiently under changing circumstances. This
way of thinking represents a kind of rule scepticism; the validity of a political
decision is established 'unabhangig von der Richtigkeit ihres Inhaltes', and
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54 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democra~ (Cambridge, Massachussets, and
London, England: The MIT Press, 1985), pp. 8-9.
55 Ibid., pp. xvii.
57 For an analysis of the relationship between Weber and Schmitt se G L VIm P EJ:. .LM h . . .. en, OUIISCfJer
e rwert. Eine Studie iiberMax l~eber lind Carl Schmitt (Weinheim' VCH Acta Hum .1991). " aruora,
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?emgs once confronted with the prospect of their own dangerousness will be terrified
into the arms ofauthority.60
In the vi~w of ~c~rmick,Schmitt, on the eve of the Weimar collapse,
sought to retneve this primal source of political order in order 'to make real
the terror of what is and what might be so as to strengthen the existing
order'.61 ~e wanted t~ ~laborate on Hobbes' view of humanity and revive the
fear that IS. characteristic ~f man'~ natural condition in three ways: '(1) by
demons~atmg the substantive affini~ between his concept of the political and
Hobbes state o~ na~re, .(2) by making dear the ever-present possibility of a
~~ to that sl~anon m the form of civil war, and (3) by convincing
individuals - partisans and nonpartisans alike - that only a state with a
mon~poly on de?sions regarding what is "political" can guarantee peace and
sec~ty'.62 Schmitt.wanted the citizens of Weimar to 'reaffirm the pact that
delivers .hwnan.be~gs. ?ut of the s~te of nature and into civil society by
transfemng ~etr illegttm,mtely .exerosed subjectivity regarding friend and
en~~y back into the s~te .63 This had been the central argument in Begriffdes
Politzschen w~ere ~tt noted: 'To the state as an essentially political entity
belongs the JUS belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation
upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from
the entity.'64
~cCo~~'s observations on this relation between myth and fear in
~tt's ~g.s~ems to me to.be very important, in that it does not only
exp~am the histonasm and medieval outlook in Schmitt interpretation of
LeuiU!han. It a1s~ becomes .a. way of explaining what Schmitt really wanted to
obtain by reducing the political to the antagonistic distinction between friend
~d ~nemy, as he did in ~griffdes ~o~tischen. As Leo Strauss had already noted
10 his commen~ .on Bw:Jf des Polia:chen, Schmitt's definition of the political
was so antagomsnc that It looked like Hobbes' state of nature: 'In Schmitt's
tenninology...the status naturalis is the genuinely political status'...Schmitt
restores the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature to a place of honor. '65
61 Ibid., pp.62S.
62 Ibid., pp. 623.
63 Ibid., pp.625.
64 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1996), pp. 45. Here from John P. McConnick Fear Technology and the State625. " , , pp.
65 Leo Strauss.,.Notes ~n Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, in Carl Schmitt, The
Concept ofthePolitical (Chicago & London: The University ofChicago Press, 1996),pp. 90.
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Schmitt recognizes,as did Hobbes, that by frightening "men" one can best "instill" in
them that principle - "the cognito ergo sum of the state" - protego ergo obligo (Concept
of the Political,pp. 52). In other words, fear is the source of political order. Human
The way Schmitt does this is by reading Hobbes historically. Unlike
Tonnies and Strauss, Schmitt focuses on the historical circumstances as the
key to Hobbe's Leviathan. According to Schmitt, Hobbes new science of
politics should be understood in the context of the religious wars caused by
the ProtestantReformation and the Catholic Counter reformation and the
English constitutional and social struggles that ravaged seventeenth century
England. To Schmitt a sentence like 'For covenants without the sword are but
words and of no strength to secure a man at all' showed the fear of civil war
that occasioned Hobbes Leviathan. By insisting on the English civil wars as
the historical background for Leuathan Schmitt wanted to show that Hobbes
utmost concern in Imathan was not to formulate a scientific theory of
politics, but to warn that the state of nature really existed. Not as. factual
historical past, but as a politicallypossible event, threatening any weak state at
any time. As Schmitt had stated in BegriJ!des Politischen any political theory has
to build on this assumption, and accordingly ought to have the preservation of
order as a main goal.As Hobbes had argued in Leuaiban, and Schmitt in Begriff
des Po/itischen, the evil nature of man made it necessary to acknowledge the
need for fear in upholding authority. McConnick has pointed to this aspect
In a brilliant essay on the reception of Hobbes by Schmitt and Strauss,
John P. McCormick has focused attention to the relationship between
technology and myth in Schmitt's reading of Hobbes. \Vhen Schmitt
emphasised that Hobbes' Leviathan had not only been a machine, but also a
mythical monster and a representative person, it, according to MeConnick,
had to do with his own theory of politics and the state, as presented in BegriJ!
des Po/itischen. To McCormick Schmitt's Begriffdes Po/itischen was an 'attempt to
refound the state solelyon it's "vital", and inevitably "mythic," element of fear,
divorcing it from the "neutralising" elements of science and technology'.58 In
other words, Schmitt (as well as Strauss) tried to 'reformulate' Hobbes as an
intellectual foundation of the state, by freeing 'it from the elements that
Hobbes himself had found necessary to employ to construct a state on this
foundation - natural science and technology'.59
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McConnick's interpretation:
Schmitt and the need for myth and fear
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Firstly, Schmitt was in a way trying to overcome the historical
development that he himself had described, namely the erosion of the
sovereign state, thereby reversing history. Although Schmitt on several
occasions, in radical historicist tenus, argued that political cultures and
theologies were bound to specific epochs, and could not be applied to others,
his own preference for a traditional and authoritarian power structure - that
ignored the reflexivity of the enlightenment and the bourgeois revolutions -
did not harmonise with his view that the present was not reducible to the past.
CarlSchlnitt - 20th-Cel1tury Hobbesian?
foundation of a new political order it is striking how problematic Schmitt's
project really was. As Gottfried has pointed out Schmitt's reading of Hobbes
was the result 'not of isolated research on a single figure but from an overview
of Western political theory and statecraft from the Middle Ages on. Schmitt
thought that he stood at the end of the epoch of sovereign states, an epoch
that Hobbes both described and justified.'68 The combination of civil anarchy
and dernystified authority signalled this erosion of sovereignty. Thus, as
Gottfried has put it, 'Schmitt returned to Hobbes, hoping to grasp the fatal
flaw that overtook the sovereign state in recent history'.69 Obviously the
problems in this project were immense.
Secondly, it is a question whether Hobbes political philosophy in itself
harmonised with Schmitt's concept of the political. Where Hobbes had
unintentio.nallypaved the way for the 'desacralisation' of modem political life
through his elements of scientific materialism, Schmitttried to 'resacralise' the
political by distancing himself from the liberals of his age. Schmitt's Begriifdes
Politischen presented the political as being at the same time intrinsically
con~ctu~ ~~ existenti~y m~~gfu1, in that it is the only activity that
reqwres individuals to risk their lives as members of a community. In this
~esp.ect ~tt ~oved beyond Hobbes, who did not require the risking of
li~e m his .protecllon-obedience axiom. In this way one could, as Leo Strauss
did, question whether this sacrificial view of the political was congruent with
Schmitt's admiration for Hobbes. Schmitt never answered Strauss on this
point.
It seems to me that one of the reasons behind Schmitt's acceptance and
temporal support of the Nazi-regime also had to do with this awareness of
myth. He saw in the Nazi movement a combin~tion of fear an~.myth that
could strengthen the weak German state. Schmitt, however, misjudged the
power of Hider and his movement, as did many other of the Ge~an
conservatives. Instead of delivering a mythical aspect to the state, Hider
overtook the state and created his own violent total quantitative state,
disregarding the necessary balance between protection and obedience. By
returning to Hobbes, Schmitt criticised this development.
Not surprisingly Schmitt's view on the nature of politics in this way to many
represents an aestheticization of conflict Many critical commentator:' of
Schmitt have, because of this, characterised Schmitt as an archetypal Wetrnar
exponent of "political e>"l'ressionism", placing him among. conserv~ti~e
revolutionaries like Ernst Jiinger. In the words of Richard Wolin, Sclunitt .1S
thus making an aesthetisation of conflict, violence, and death 'as ends U1
themselves.'66 Although this may be true in the case ofJiinger who loo~ed at
war as a kind of process of catharsis, it is not true in the case of Schmitt. As
McConnick rightly has pointed out, 'Schmitt seeks to make the threat of
conflict _ of war - felt and feared not as an end in itself..but rather so as to
make war's outbreak all the more unlikely domestically, and it's prosecution
more easily facilitated abroad.v? In other words Sc~~'s intention of
aestheticizing conflict had a quite different purpose. Pointing to J:I0bbes,
Schmitt, in his own mind, was trying to create the fear of conflict, t?at
Hobbes had showed was a necessary condition for upholding state authooty!
In this way Schmitt's Begriffdes Politischen was not only an attempt to des~ribe
realities as Schmitt saw them. It was in itself an attempt to re-establish a
mythical framework for the State. This awareness of the importance of myth
was not something Sclunitt only borrowed from Ho?bes, bu~ also from
George Sorel, who had made this insight the foundation of his th~ory of
revolution. \Vhere Sorel had made the myth of the general strike the
foundation of revolution, Schmitt made the myth of conflict the foundation
of the state; that is in order to prevent the revolutionl!!
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Concluding Remarks
When one looks at Schmitt's interpretation of Hobbes' Leviathan and
Schmitt's own attempt to construct a critique of liberalism that could be a
..Fu~enno~,.Schmitt'sattempt to establish a decisionist concept of the
political m which the constitutional state is seen as a problem, also is
problematic in relation to Hobbes. As Habennas has noted 'This
scenario...co~pletely disregards the fact that from the beginning Hobbes had
dev~~oped his cC?ncept of sovereignty in connection with the development of
positive law. In terms of its very concept, positive law requires a political
66 Richard Wolin, The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror, in
Politico/Theory, Vol. 20, No.3, August 1992,pp. 424-447.
68 Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt. Politics and Theory (New York & Westport, Connecticut &
London: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 50.
67 John P. McCormick, Fear, Technology, and the State, In Political Theory, Vol. 22 No.4,
November 1994. pp. 626.
69 Ibid., pp. 50.
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legislator who can no longer be tied to the superordinate norms o,fnatu~allaw
_ and to this extent is sovereign. Thus Hobbes's idea of a s.overelgn legISlator
h . bound to the medium of positive law already contains the seed of thew 015 . t
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The German playwright and author Botho Strauf aroused great
attention with the publication of his essay "Anschueliender Bocksgesang" in
Der Spiegel no. 6 1993. The title is rather difficult to translate.
"AnschJvellendel' means roughly "swollen" or "expanding" while
"Bocksgesang" literally means "buck song", which in tum is derived from
the Greek term for "tragedy". The attention he received was mostly of a
negative nature, as someone who was up to that point was regarded as a
man of the "left" now confessed his allegiance to the right. The essay has
been re-published, this time as a longer and more sprawling version in
the anthology Die selbstbeiuusste Nation, l where it is the point of departure
for a number of writers grappling for the answer to the question of what
ideas and themes the "new right" should base itself on. The "new" right
is no new phenomenon, the label was applied already in the 1960's, but it
is only more recently that it has been anything but a marginal political
phenomenon.
What Straufl's essay ·which begins the anthology is really all about is
difficult to say, but is has a mysterious power of attraction as it is thought
to contain deep insight into the "spirit of the times" (Zeitgeis~. He
confesses, as stated above his allegiance to the right, as he means that it is
from there that one can best understand the tragic contemporary
circumstances we live in, where humanity's bloody side once again
routinely confronts us. Liberal democracy's self understanding, the "1789
ideas", are thought to be entirely inadequate. Racism and contempt for
foreigners is interpreted by Strauf as the emergence of that which has
been repressed and as religious purification rituals. He continuously
appeals for a departure from the "Mainstream", that is to say, the
70 Jiirgen Haberrnas, The Horrors ~f Auto~omy: Carl Schmitt in English, in Jiirgen
Haberrnas, TheNezvConset7llJtism (Cambodge: Pohty Press, 1989), pp. 131.
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